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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 23, 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
Minnesota's implied consent statute to be constitutional in State v.S 2
Brooks.' The court based its holding on two main principles. First,
before analyzing whether the statute was constitutional, the court
held that Brooks voluntarily consented to a chemical test that
f JD Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2015; BSCJS, Criminal
Justice Studies, University of North Dakota. The author would like to thank the
Volume 41 staff and board for their dedication and hard work. Additionally, the
author would like to thank his family and friends for their support and guidance.
1. 838 N.W.2d 563, 573 (Minn. 2013).
2. See id. at 568-73.
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measured his blood alcohol content (BAC).' Second, the court
held the statute was constitutional because implied consent
statutes-which under certain circumstances require motorists
suspected of drunk driving to consent to chemical testing-are a
legitimate "legal tool" that states may use to help fight drunk
driving.4
This Case Note first summarizes the relevant legal history
behind implied consent statutes across the United States." In
addition, this Case Note analyzes the relevant legal history behind
Minnesota's implied consent statute.6 Further, this Case Note
outlines the factual and procedural history of State v. Brooks.
7
Finally, this Case Note argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court
correctly held that Minnesota's implied consent statute is
constitutional. Specifically, this Case Note concludes that the
Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning is sound because the State
may attach reasonable conditions for drivers to exercise their
privilege to drive.9 Additionally, numerous public policy arguments
exist in favor of Minnesota's implied consent statute.
II. HISTORY BEHIND IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTES
A. Development Within the United States
Drunk drivers have gradually become one of the biggest
dangers citizens in the United States face." On average, "[e]very
day in America . . . 28 people die as a result of drunk driving
3. See id. at 568-72.
4. Id. at 572 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013)
(plurality opinion)).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Parts IV-V.
10. See infra Part IV.D.
11. See Kelsey P. Black, Note, Undue Protection Versus Undue Punishment:
Examining the Drinking and Driving Problem Across the United States, 40 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 463, 463 (2007) ("Over the past few decades, society has begun to recognize
and respond to the increasing number of fatalities caused by intoxicated
drivers."); Katherine L. Cicardo, Note, We Won't Take "No" For an Answer: The
Validity of Louisiana's No-Refusal Policy, 73 LA. L. REV. 253, 253 (2012) ("Today,
alcohol-impaired driving is still one of the most common crimes both globally and
in the United States.").
2015] 1501
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crashes."' 2 Nationally, controlling the persistent issue of drunk
driving has been a difficult problem for some time.' 3 Even today,
the task of preventing drunk driving remains even more
challenging, given the increase in "vehicles on the nation's
roadways[,] . .. budgetary and manpower constraints[,] ... and
crucial constitutional concerns.,,14
In response to this wide-sweeping problem, "all 50 States have
adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition
of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC
testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a
drunk-driving offense. ' These statutes are, in part, premised on
the long-standing legal principal that the legislature may impose
reasonable conditions to be complied with in order to use the
state's highways. 6
Typically, the chemical test may not be given when a suspect
refuses to take the test. 7 Refusal to take the test, however, generally
12. Drunk Driving Statistics, MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving
/about/drunk-driving-statistics.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015) (citing NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIc SAFETY FAcrs: 2013 DATA 1 (2014),
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812102.pdf).
13. See Eustace T. Francis, Combating the Drunk Driver Menace: Conditioning the
Use of Public Highways on Consent to Sobriety Checkpoint Seizures-The Constitutionality
of a Model Consent Seizure Statute, 59 ALB. L. REv. 599, 601 (1995) ("The battle by
states to rid their highways of the menace to public health and safety posed by
intoxicated drivers is not a new phenomenon and probably dates back to the dawn
of the widespread use of the automobile as a means of public conveyance."); D. C.
Barrett, Annotation, Suspension or Revocation of Driver's License for Refusal to Take
Sobriety Test, 88 A.L.R. 2d 1064, § 1[c] (1963).
14. Francis, supra note 13, at 601.
15. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013); Jonathan M. Purver,
Annotation, Driving While Intoxicated: Subsequent Consent to Sobriety Test as Affecting
Initial Refusal, 28 A.L.R. 5th 459, § 2[a] (1995) (stating that "implied consent
statutes... provide that any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public
highways is deemed to have given . . . consent to a chemical test of his or her
blood, breath, urine, or saliva for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content of the blood").
16. See Tina Wescott Cafaro, Fixing the Fatal Flaws in OUI Implied Consent Laws,
34 J. LEGIS. 99, 103 (2008) ("The Supreme Court first recognized the basic
principle of an implied consent law in connection with motor vehicle use in 1927
when it held that a state can condition the use of its highways by finding that an
alien motorist had impliedly consented to suit within its jurisdiction." (emphasis
added)); Cicardo, supra note 11, at 253.
17. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1565 ("[W]e have held that medically drawn
blood tests are reasonable in appropiate circumstances ... [but] [w]e have never
1502 [Vol. 41:4
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results in the motorist's driver's license being "subject to
suspension or revocation."' 8 As a result, many of the statutes
have been challenged for "violat[ing] due process of
law, ... infring[ing] upon the guaranty against self-incrimination,
depriv[ing] a licensee of equal protection, . . . [and for providing]. ,,19
an unreasonable search and seizure. The most recent challenges
to implied consent statutes primarily involve the Fourth
Amendment, which states, "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."2 0 This is because the
human body implicates privacy interests that are heavily
21protected.
One of the first pivotal cases with regard to implied consent
22
statutes came from California in 1966. In fact, California's original
implied consent statute was adopted based on the Court's decision
in Schmerber v. California.23 In Schmerber, the United States Supreme
Court answered whether police officers had the right to take a
blood sample from a non-consenting party, without a warrant.2
The decision in Schmerber was very fact-specific and did not provide
law enforcement free reign to take warrantless blood samples in all
situations. 5
retreated . . . from our recognition that any compelled intrusion into the human
body implicates significant, constitutionally protected privacy interests." (emphasis
added)); Purver, supra note 15, § 2[a].
18. Purver, supra note 15, § 2[a].
19. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1565; Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Search
Conducted by School Official or Teacher as Violation of Fourth Amendment or Equivalent
State Constitutional Provision, 31 A.L.R. 5th 229, § 6[a] (1986) ("[S]ociety
recognizes the interest in the integrity of one's person, and the Fourth
Amendment applies with its fullest vigor against any intrusion on the human
body." (quoting Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 478 (5th
Cir. 1982))).
22. See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (indicating that
certiorari was granted to review Fourth Amendment and other claims in light of
constitutional decisions since Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957)).
23. Berkley v. Miller, No. EDCV 13-1745-JGB (MAN), 2014 WL 2042249, at
*13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014).
24. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
25. See id. ("It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on
the facts of the present record." (emphasis added)); cf. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1560
(stating that each case requires a fact-specific inquiry).
15032015]
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In Schmerber, the defendant was convicted for driving an
automobile while under the influence of alcohol. 26 The defendant
was arrested at a hospital while being treated for injuries he
suffered as a result of an automobile accident.27 The police
obtained a blood sample from the presiding physician, which• . 28
indicated the defendant was intoxicated. At trial, the defendant
objected to the admissibility of the chemical test because the blood
sample was taken despite the fact he refused to consent to it.2
9
The United States Supreme Court held the warrantless blood
test did not violate the defendant's rights under the Fourth
Amendment.30 The Court recognized that "[t]he itegrity of an
individual's person is a cherished value of our society.' However,
the Court went on to say that "the Constitution does not forbid the
States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently
limited conditions." 2 The Court arrived at this conclusion, in part,
because given the nature of the evidence, it was reasonable for the
officer to believe the delay necessary to receive a warrant may have
led to the evidence being lost.3 3 For roughly the next fifty years,
Schmerber remained the leading precedent regarding blood
testing.34
In 2013, implied consent laws came under heavy scrutiny
before the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely.
Prior to this case, warrantless blood tests around the country were
often utilized because of fear that the natural dissipation of alcohol
from the body would destroy evidence necessary for drunk-driving
violations. More specifically, the warrantless searches were upheld
under the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant
26. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 758-59.
29. Id. at 759.
30. Id. at 772.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 770.
34. See Paul A. Clark, Do Warrantless Breathalyzer Tests Violate the Fourth
Amendment?, 44 N.M. L. REv. 89, 90 (2014).
35. See id. ("The McNeely decision has wide ranging and significant
implications for drunk driving prosecutions in the United States."); see also
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
36. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770; Clark, supra
note 34, at 101.
1504 [Vol. 41:4
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requirement." This exception states that "a warrantless entry by
criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when there is
compelling need for official action and no time to secure 
a warrant.,38
In McNeely, the Court asked "whether the natural
metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se
exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-
driving cases. 3 9 The McNeely Court held that the natural dissipation
of alcohol, by itself, does not "categorically" mandate an exigency
in every case. Rather, "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a
drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by
case based on the totality of the circumstances."" The holding in
McNeely, however, left many questions unanswered." One gray area
that many states may need to address in the near future is whether3
a warrant will be needed in all DWI cases. Given the recency of
McNeely, the effect on the states remains unseen.4 4 In all likelihood,
however, the legal community will see an increase in the amount of
warrants applied for.45
B. Minnesota's Implied Consent Statute
Collectively, Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.50 to 169A.53
are referred to as Minnesota's "Implied Consent Law., 46 "The
37. See Clark, supra note 34, at99 ("[M]any courts interpreting Schmerber have
held as a matter of law that there is never time to obtain a warrant for a blood
alcohol test.").
38. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (emphasis added).
39. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1556.
40. Id. at 1563.
41. Id.
42. Aron Hogden, Note, Reconciling a Split of Authority: A South Dakota Response
to Recent Developments in Drunk Driving Law, 59 S.D. L. REV. 372, 373 (2014)
(" [B] ecause McNeely was not argued on the facts of the case ... the Court's analysis
fails to provide adequate guidance to either state courts or . . . to police officers
contemplating what the Fourth Amendment requires of them.").
43. See Benjamin W. Perry, Fourth Amendment-Warrantless, Nonconsensual
Seizures of a DWI Suspect's Blood: What Happens if You Say No to the Breathalyzer?-




46. MINN. STAT. § 169A.50 (2014); 32 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Motor Vehicles
§ 9.00 (5th ed. 2003).
15052015]
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implied consent statute is civil in nature, and therefore imposes a
separate" set of procedures that are independent from criminalS47
punishment. In Minnesota, "[a] ny person who drives, operates, or
is in physical control of a motor vehicle . . .consents . . . to a
chemical test of that person's blood, breath, or urine for the
purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, a controlled
substance . . . or a hazardous substance. 48 Test administration,
49however, must conform to a few requirements.
First, "[t]he test must be administered at the direction of a
peace officer."50 Second, before a test can be required, an officer
must have "probable cause to believe the person was impaired
while driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle
in violation of [Minnesota Statutes] section 169A.20.'
Additionally, the peace officer must inform the person of the
52"implied consent advisory" at the time the officer requests a test.
This advisory requires an officer to inform the suspect of four
important legal implications: (1) "Minnesota law requires the
person to take [the] test," (2) "refusal to take [the] test is a crime,"
(3) under some circumstances a test will be administered even
without the person's consent, and (4) "the person has the right to
consult with an attorney" to the extent that it will not
"unreasonably delay administration of the test.'53
Despite the nature of implied consent, a suspect may choose to
withdraw their consent and refuse to comply with chemical
54 5testing. Except under certain circumstances, "[i]f a person
47. Jeffrey S. Sheridan & Erika Burkhart Booth, Revoke First, Ask Questions
Later: Challenging Minnesota's Unconstitutional Pre-Hearing Revocation Scheme, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2005) (citing DONALD H. NICHOLS, THE DRINKING
DRIVER IN MINNESOTA § 3.01 (5th ed. 2004)); see also Walek v. Comm'r of Pub.
Safety, 361 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the burden of
proof is "preponderance of the evidence" in implied consent laws because
"[i] mplied consent proceedings are civil").
48. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1 (a).
49. See id. § 169A.51, subdivs. 1-7.
50. Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1 (a).
51. Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1 (b).
52. Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 2(a).
53. Id.
54. See id. § 169A.52; MARTINJ. COSTrLLO, MINNESOTA MISDEMEANORS: DWI,
TRAFFIC, CRIMINAL, AND ORDINANCE OFFENSES § 17.11(2)(e)(ii) (Matthew Bender
ed., 2014) ("[C]onsent remains in effect until the driver withdraws it."). Officers
may still test someone, however, if the person is unconscious or in a condition that
prevents them from being able to give refusal, because it is treated as if the person
1506 [Vol. 41:4
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refuses to permit a test, then a test must not be given .... Refusal
to submit to the test, however, constitutes a gross misdemeanor,57
and the person's license may be revoked for a period of not less
than one year.58 Arguably, the most influential case in Minnesota to
deal with implied consent came in 2013 when the Minnesota
Supreme Court decided State v. Brooks.59
III. THE BROOKS DECISION
A. Facts and Procedure
On July 31, 2009, in Scott County, Minnesota, a Shakopee
police officer stopped a white SUV that had just left a bar.6" The
officer noticed the scent of alcohol on the driver, Wesley Eugene
Brooks, and asked Brooks to step out of his vehicle. After
consulting with his attorney-who was also present in the car-
62
Brooks refused to submit to any field sobriety testing. The officer
then took Brooks to the St. Francis Medical 
Center.63
Shordy after, the officer gave Brooks the Minnesota implied
consent advisory.64 After initially refusing to submit to any chemical
testing, Brooks eventually provided a urine sample.G5 The alcohol
concentration in Brooks' urine came back at 0.14%, above the
0.08% legal limit.6
Subsequently, on January 16, 2010, a Minnesota state trooper
stopped Brooks while driving on Interstate 35 in Minneapolis. 6v
has not withdrawn the implied consent. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 6.
55. Id. § 169A.52, subdiv. 1 ("[I]f a peace officer has probable cause to
believe that the person has [committed criminal vehicular homicide], a test may
be required and obtained despite the person's refusal.").
56. Id.
57. Id. § 169A.20, subdiv. 2; id. § 169A.26.
58. Id. § 169A.52, subdiv. 3.
59. See generally State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013).





65. Id. Initially Brooks refised to listen and demanded to speak to his
attorney. Id. Brooks finally submitted to the testing after the implied consent
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The state trooper stopped Brooks because there were sparks flying
out from underneath his vehicle. 6 Once again, Brooks appeared to
be under the influence, so the state trooper transported Brooks to
the Hennepin County Medical Center.69 At the Hennepin County
Medical Center, the state trooper read the implied consent advisory
to Brooks.7" After he was unable to provide a urine sample, Brooks
consulted with his attorney and agreed to provide a blood test."
Brooks' blood sample contained an alcohol concentration of
0.16%.72
Brooks' final encounter with law enforcement occurred in
Scott County, on January 25, 2010.73 On that date, Prior Lake police
responded to reports of an erratic driver who was now sleeping in
his car. When the police arrived on the scene, they found Brooks
unconscious in the driver's seat with his foot on the brake while the
car was running.75 The officers noticed an odor of alcohol on
Brooks' breath, and Brooks' eyes appeared to be bloodshot and76
watery. In addition, Brooks had trouble keeping his balance and
needed assistance walking.77 Brooks was eventually brought to the
Scott County Jail because he became "agitated" and refused to
listen as the officers attempted to read the implied consent
advisory.78 After briefly speaking with his attorney and attempting
"to tip over a table with his hands," Brooks provided the officers
with a urine sample, which contained an alcohol concentration of
0.16%.
71
In all three incidents between Brooks and the police, the
police never tried to secure a search warrant.'s For each of the
three encounters with police, Brooks was charged "with two counts








75. Id. at 565-66.




80. Id. at 565-66.
81. Id. at 566.
1508 [Vol. 41:4
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In each case, "Brooks moved to suppress the results of the
blood and urine tests . . . because [the] police took the samples
without a warrant. '8 2 In the Scott County cases, the judge denied
the motion to suppress because "the evanescent quality of alcohol
in the body created exigent circumstances that excused police from
seeking a warrant." 3 The judge in Hennepin County also denied
the motion to suppress, but "concluded that Brooks consented to




After the motions to suppress were denied, the cases
proceeded to trial. 85 Brooks was convicted in each case of first-
degree driving while impaired, in violation of Minnesota Statutes
sections 169A.20, subdivision 1(5) and 169A.24."' Brooks was
eventuall sentenced separately in Scott County and Hennepin
County."'
In two independent Minnesota Court of Appeals opinions,
Brooks' convictions were affirmed. 8 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals supported its opinion on Minnesota Supreme Court
"precedent[,] holding that the evanescent quality of alcohol in the
body created a single-factor exigent circumstance that on its own
allowed police to search drivers suspected of driving under the
influence without a warrant."s'
Initially, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied Brooks'
petitions for review. '1 Next, Brooks filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court, after
granting the petition, vacated and remanded the case for further
judgments.9 ' Subsequently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
"reinstated Brooks'[] appeals . . . [and the Minnesota Supreme
Court] granted the State's petitions for accelerated 
review. ", 2
82. Id.




87. See id. at 566-67.




92. Id. (citation omitted).
15092015]
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B. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Reasoning
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed Brooks' convictions based on two separate
lines of reasoning." The court held, in part, that "a driver's
decision to agree to take a test is not coerced simply because
Minnesota has attached the penalty of making it a crime to refuse
the test. ' M In support of that conclusion, the court stated nothing
suggested that Brooks' will had been overborne or that his capacity
for self-determination was critically impaired. The court further
reasoned that Brooks' discussions with counsel before agreeing to
take each test supported the conclusion that Brooks voluntarily
consented. Additionally, the court stated that by reading Brooks
the implied consent advisory, the police made it clear to Brooks
97that he could choose whether to submit to the testing. 7
The court also relied on a second line of reasoning. Brooks
argued that even if he did consent, the implied consent statute is
unconstitutional. 9' The court, however, disagreed and concluded
that the implied consent statute is a legal tool that can be used to
enforce dnik-driving laws. 99 The court concluded that these "legal
tools" can be used to "condition[] the privilege of driving on
agreeing to a warrantless search.""°
Justice Stras, in his concurring opinion, did not agree with the
majority that Brooks voluntarily consented to the tests.9° Justice
Stras, rather, felt this case was the perfect opportunity for the court
to adopt a rule set out by the United States Supreme Court which
states that "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance
on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary
rule."' In his opinion, "ri]t is hard to imagine how Brooks'[]
93. See id. at 572-73.
94. Id. at 570.
95. Id. at 571.
96. Id. at 571-72.
97. Id. at 572.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 573 (Stras, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 574 (quoting Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1510 [Vol. 41:4
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consent could have been voluntar when he was advised that refusal
103
to consent to a search is 
a crime.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Brooks' Consent Was Voluntary
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and,,104 •• ••1
seizures, shall not be violated .... Unless an exception applies,
law enforcement must obtain a warrant before invading an area in
which people hold an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy. But, police do not need a warrant if the subject of the
search consents."'
0 6
One of the major differences between Missouri v. McNeely and
State v. Brooks is that the defendant in McNeely did not consent to
the blood test that was administered.'O Despite his refusal, the
police still ordered the medical lab technician to take a sample of
the defendant's blood."" In Brooks, the defendant received time to
consult with his lawyer, became informed of the Minnesota implied
consent statute, and became informed that refusal to take the test
constituted a criminal offense.'0 9 Ultimately, Brooks consented to
the test on each occasion with the police. 11 One of the most
contested issues in the Brooks decision, however, was whether-
because of the threatened criminal offense for test refusal-Brooks
actually consented to take the test."'
103. Id. at 573-74 (citations omitted).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
105. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Phyllis T. Bookspan,
Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 473, 479 (1991) ("[A] warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the
search falls into an exception.").
106. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973)); see Clark, supra note 34, at 105 ("Although government-
compelled breath tests are searches for Fourth Amendment purposes, the state or
federal government does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the searched
person consents to the search.").
107. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1557 (2013).
108. Id.
109. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 565-66.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 568-72.
15112015]
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It is important to identify what is required for consent to be
valid for Fourth Amendment purposes. A citizen's consent to a
search must be voluntarily given to the law enforcement officer.'1
2
Voluntariness on the part of the citizen is the only prerequisite for
the validity of the consent to search.1 3 Searches are not voluntary
when they are "the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied."' ' To determine voluntariness, the court must consider
the totality of the circumstances.'"5
Some states, and the federal government, have recognized a
number of common factors for determining voluntariness."
6
Courts across the country may consider the following factors when
analyzing the totality of the circumstances."7 They include: (1) the
"apparent authority of the searching officer,'" (2) whether there
were a large number of law enforcement officers present,"' (3) the
specific circumstances in place when the search was conducted, 120
(4) "whether the subject was advised of the constitutional right to
refuse, " 2 and (5) if "refusal would result in deprivation of a right
or benefit.'
' 22
Applying these factors to the Brooks case clearly shows that
Brooks voluntarily consented to Minnesota's implied consent
112. See State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 102 (Minn. 1999) ("If Harris did not
give voluntary consent to the search, then the evidence gathered thereafter must
be suppressed.").
113. Id. Compare State v. Kivimaki, 345 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Minn. 1984) ("In
order for a statement taken from an accused during custodial interrogation to be
admitted, the prosecution must prove that the accused knowingly and intelligently
waived his right against self-incrimination, and that the statement was freely and
voluntarily made." (emphasis added)), with 42 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Search and
Seizure § 4.02 (5th ed. 2012) ("Consent to search need only be voluntary, that is,
uncoerced, and need not be knowing or intelligent.").
114. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); State v. Diede, 795
N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
115. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227; Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 846 (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
116. SeeWheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1147 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (listing
factors courts may consider when determining whether a suspect voluntarily
consented to a warrantless search).
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)).
119. Id. (citing United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1974)).
120. Id. (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229).
121. Id. (citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966)).
122. Id. (citing United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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statute. When analyzing the facts, it is also important to remember
what standard of review applies for determining whether consent
was voluntary. The Minnesota Supreme Court has utilized a "clearly
erroneous" standard. 23 Therefore, the court will only reverse the
trial court's findings "if, on the entire evidence, [the court was] left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
occurred." 124
The Brooks court correctly decided the case, based on the facts,
for the following reasons.1 2 5 First, the responding officers had the
requisite authority to ask Brooks for his consent to search. 2 6 Brooks
was arrested for driving while impaired, and the police asked him
to submit to testing pursuant to Minnesota's implied consent127
statute. Second, when Brooks consented on all three occasions,
he was only in the presence of a single police officer. 12 Therefore,
officer presence should not be an issue in the analysis."' Third, the
officers read Brooks the implied consent advisory in each case."O
The United States Supreme Court has specifically stated that
knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not required to show
voluntariness, but it does help.3 ' Finally, although Brooks was in
custody when consent was given, he received ample opportunity to
talk with his attorney.1 2 Therefore, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly decided
that Brooks consented to the chemical testing.
Brooks specifically contended that his consent was not
voluntary because he agreed to submit to the testing only after
being informed that refusal constituted a crime. 3 Being positioned
123. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011).
124. Id. at 846-47.
125. The court went through these facts but did not address them each in the
same way the author has below.
126. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
127. State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 565-66 (Minn. 2013).
128. Id. at 565-66.
129. See generally United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1974)
(discussing the presence of officers as a factor to consider when deciding whether
consent was given voluntarily).
130. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 565-66.
131. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002) ("While
knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account,
the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an
effective consent." (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227
(1973))).
132. See Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 565-66.
133. Id. at 568.
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in an uncomfortable encounter with law enforcement during
questioning, however, does not automatically mean consent was
given involuntarily.' This principle has been applied not only in
the context of implied consent statutes, but also in a number of
other situations.
35
For example, in United States v. DeAngelo, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld an airport security
search of a passenger's bag that revealed possession of marijuana.
Despite the fact that the defendant would not be allowed to board
the plane if he did not allow the airport authority to search his bag,
the court held that the defendant still consented to the search." 7
While not entirely similar, important analogies between
DeAngelo and Brooks can easily be identified. In DeAngelo, the airport
security had an important interest in protecting passengers who
utilize the airlines. 8 In Brooks, the implied consent statute serves
the important purpose of protecting drivers from intoxicated
drivers on the state's roads and highways.'39 More importantly with
respect to consent, the court in DeAngelo recognized that
passengers "had a choice of traveling by air or by some other
means."1 40 Similarly, Brooks-along with any other driver in the
134. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 846 (Minn. 2011) (citing State v. Dezso,
512 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994)). But see State v. High, 287 Minn. 24, 27, 176
N.W.2d 637, 639 (1970) ("Consent must be the product of more than mere
submission to legal authority." (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 322
U.S. 65 (1944))).
135. See Francis, supra note 13, at 644-45 ("[T]hese statutes have spawned
regulations to address security and safety at airports, courthouses, concert arenas,
sports arenas, and prisons.").
136. 584 F.2d 46, 47 (4th Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d
884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973) ("Compelling the defendant to choose between
exercising Fourth Amendment fights and his right to travel constitutes coercion;
the government cannot be said to have established that the defendant freely and
voluntarily consent [sic] to the search when to do otherwise would have meant
foregoing the constitutional right to travel.").
137. See DeAngelo, 584 F.2d at 47.
138. See id. ("[T]he screening system is designed to deter as well as prevent
passengers form carrying weapons or explosives.").
139. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) (recognizing a state's
ability enact legislation to combat drunk-driving). See generally State v. Brooks, 838
N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013).
140. DeAngelo, 584 F.2d at 47 ("When he voluntarily entered upon the
screening process DeAngelo acquiesced in its full potential scope as represented
to him, including physical inspection if, as developed, that should be requested.").
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State of Minnesota-had a choice from the beginning whether to
drive and therefore to consent to Minnesota's implied consent
statute, from the time he got behind the wheel of his car."'
The question of consent and coercion has also been addressed
in the context of the Fifth Amendment.' 2 In South Dakota v. Neville,
two South Dakota police officers stopped a car and noticed the
driver appeared to be intoxicated.4 4 The defendant, after being
asked on numerous occasions by the officers, repeatedly refused to
submit to chemical testing. 144 The defendant refused to take the
test despite the fact that, in South Dakota, test refusal could be
used against him.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of his• . . 146
refusal to comply with chemical testing. The trial court granted
the motion, and the State appealed. The case eventually came
before the United States Supreme Court, and the Court held "a
refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully
requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not
protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.""s Essentially,
the Court decided that the test refusal evidence could be included
at trial and used against the defendant. " 9
The Court came to this conclusion by recognizing "the choice
to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol test will not be an easy
or pleasant one for a suspect to make. '"" ° However, "the criminal
process often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult
choices." 5 ' The Neville decision is factually similar to Brooks. The
defendants in both cases were faced with tough consequences if
they refused chemical testing. 52 Despite these facts, both the
141. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 572 ("[W]e hold that Brooks voluntarily consented
to the searches .... ").
142. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983).
143. Id. at 554-55.
144. Id. at 555-56.
145. Id. at 556.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 564.
149. See id. at 564-65.
150. Id. at 564.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 556 (noting that evidence of test refusal could be used against
the defendant at trial); State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 573-74 (Minn. 2013)
(noting that test refusal could result in additional criminal charges against the
15152015]
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United States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court
found that the defendants were not coerced in their decisions.15
For the reasons stated above, the Minnesota Supreme Court was
correct in holding that Brooks consented to the chemical testing.,
54
B. Implied Consent Statutes Are a Valid Exercise of Police Power
"The concept of police powers did not really exist when the
Constitution was created. '' 155 The concept first emerged over half a
century later after lawyers and jurists recognized that sometimes
the best way to protect the security of private rights is to enact• 156
legislation that tends to promote the public welfare. Among the
states, the recognition of a state's "police power" is not a novelty. 57
Precisely defining this term, however, has proven to be
challenging. 1s Nevertheless, police power "generally [is] defined as
the power of the state to impose such restraints upon private rights
as are necessary for the general welfare." 59A state's police power "is
one of the most essential of governmental powers and one of the least
limitable.""6°
Across the nation, courts have upheld statutes that are
supported by the legislature exercising police power." The
applicability of police powers affects both civil and criminal issues.
For example, in Kewley v. Department of Elementary & Secondary
defendant).
153. See Neville, 459 U.S. at 564; Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 572.
154. See supra Part V.A.
155. Samuel R. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A
Historical Study of Contract Clause Jurisprudence, 72 OR. L. REv. 513, 521 (1993).
156. Id.
157. See Mut. Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1911) (recognizing
Massachusetts' ability to pass legislation pursuant to its police power in 1911); see
also Nw. Tel. Exch. Co. v. Minneapolis, 81 Minn. 140, 162, 86 N.W. 69, 74 (1901)
(recognizing the State of Minnesota's police powers in the early 1900s).
158. See Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 322, 24 N.W.2d
244, 250 (1946) ("The term 'police power' is not susceptible of precise
definition ... ."), overruled by Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 608
(Minn. 1978).
159. Alexander Co., 222 Minn. at 322, 24 N.W.2d at 250.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 433, 249
N.W. 334, 338 (1933) ("[Tlhe [l]egislature, under the police power of the state,
has authority to enact laws to relieve a public emergency even though such laws
temporarily impair obligations of contract....").
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Education, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that the state's
police powers enabled the legislature to adopt legislation that
affected teaching licenses within the schools. Additionally, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court recently recognized the legislature's
ability, through the state's police powers, to enact laws regulating
elections.' Finally, in State v. Boushee, the North Dakota Supreme
Court recognized the State's ability, through its police power, to
enact statutes aimed at controlling drug abuse.
The court in Brooks did not explicitly mention the use of the
state's police power in upholding the implied 
consent statute.165
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has upheld laws passed
by the Minnesota State Legislature in the past by recognizing the
proper exercise of police power. 66 In fact, the supreme court has
specifically referenced the State's ability to limit the operation of
motor vehicles on highways pursuant to its police powers.
167 In
Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, the supreme court considered
whether the Commissioner of Highways, under relevant statutory
powers, could suspend the license of any driver without a
preliminary hearing upon a sufficient showing that the licensee is a
habitual violator of traffic laws. The court held that "[p] ermission
to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways . . . is always
subject to such regulation and control as public authority see [s] fit
to impose under the police power in the interest of public safety
and welfare."'68
162. 15 N.E.3d 224, 230-31 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).
163. See League of Women Voters v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 50, 357 Wis. 2d
360, 851 N.W.2d 302 ("[T]he legislature has the power to regulate in ways that
affect the mode and manner of conducting elections. .. ").
164. 284 N.W.2d 423, 432 (N.D. 1979) (stating that North Dakota has a
sufficient goal in mind when the police power is used to combat drugs).
165. See State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013).
166. See State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 906 (Minn. 1983) (holding that
"[t]he [S]tate has a compelling interest in public safety on the highways and, in
the proper exercise of its police power, has enacted [a statute which allows for
DWI arrests for acts not committed in the presence of the police]"); see also State v.
Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 102 (Minn. 2012) (upholding a statute that punished
speech as a valid exercise of police power).
167. See Anderson v. Comm'r of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 317, 126 N.W.2d
778, 784 (1964).
168. Id. at 309-10, 126 N.W.2d at 779.
169. Id. at 317, 126 N.W.2d at 784.
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Further, other states have upheld implied consent statutes as a
valid exercise of the state's police power. 17 In State v. Moore, the
Washington Supreme Court faced a challenge to the state's implied
consent statute. 71 In Moore, the petitioner was arrested for drunk
driving and was advised that if he did not submit to a breathalyzer
his license would be revoked. 72 The petitioner submitted to the
test, but then challenged his conviction based-in part, and
consistently with Brooks-on the assertion that Washington's
implied consent law was unconstitutional.'
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
trial court. 1 ' The court specifically reasoned that "the [implied
consent] law, with its rights afforded the accused, is constitutionally
sustainable as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power."
The court further accepted "the reduction of traffic carnage
occasioned by the inebriated driver" as a sufficient purpose for
having the statute."'
Similarly, the New Mexico Court of Appeals specifically
decided whether its Implied Consent Act was a valid exercise of the
state's police powers. In Marez v. Taxation & Revenue Department,
Motor Vehicle Division, the appellant's license was revoked after he
refused to take a breath-alcohol test. 17 The appellant argued that
the Implied Consent Act was unconstitutional because it was a
violation of his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights.7 9
The New Mexico Court of Appeals disagreed. In the opinion, the
court specifically stated, "There is a well-established line of cases in
both the New Mexico courts and the United States Supreme Court
170. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 483 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1971).
171. Id. at 631-32.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 632.
174. Id. at 635.
175. Id. at 634.
176. Id.
177. See Marez v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, Motor Vehicle Div., 893 P.2d 494
(N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
178. Id. at 495.
179. See id.
180. See id. ("We hold that there was no violation of Marez' [sic] constitutional
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that approves the use of implied consent acts as a valid exercise of
the police power of the state."""
C. Driving Is a Privilege, Not a Right
While the state's police powers are integral to the rationale
behind implied consent laws, the principle that driving is a
privilege and not a right is also integral to the implied consent
rationale."" Minnesota Statutes section 171.02 states, "Except when
expressly exempted, a person shall not drive a motor vehicle upon
a street or highway in this state unless the person has a valid
license. ' ' Further, the ability to use a motor vehicle on a public
highway is a "license or privilege. '' 8 5 "The principle that driving is a
privilege and not a right has been recognized by courts for almost
100 years."86
181. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983)); see [n re
McCain, 506 P.2d 1204, 1209 (N.M. 1973); State v. Sandoval, 683 P.2d 516, !518
(N.M. Ct. App. 1984)).
182. See supra Part IV.B.
183. Cafaro, supra note 16, at 102 ("The rationale behind this is that '[t]he
right to drive a motor vehicle on the public streets is not a natural right but a
privilege, subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest.'" (emphasis
added) (quoting Standish v. Dep't of Revenue, 683 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Kan. 1984))).
184. MINN. STAT. § 171.02, subdiv. 1(a) (2014).
185. 32 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Motor Vehicles, supra note 46, § 8; see also
Driving Is a Privilege, Not a Right, DRIVERSED.COM, https://driversed.com/driving
-information/the-driving-privilege/driving-is-a-privilege-not-a-right.aspx (last visited
Apr. 9, 2015) ("Driving is not a constitutional right. You get your drivers license
based on the skills you have and the rules you agree to follow.").
186. Cafaro, supra note 16, at 102; see, e.g., Hugh v. McCarthy, 353 P.2d 276,
290 (Cal. 1960).
[I]t [is] imperative not to lose sight of or transgress the established
principles that "'The 'use of highways for purposes of travel and
transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental
right, of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be
deprived . . .' [but that] 'the use of the public highways by motor
vehicles, with its constant dangers, renders the reasonableness and
necessity of regulation apparent."'
Id. (quoting Escobedo v. State, 222 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1950)); see State v. Garner, 608
P.2d 1321, 1324 (Kan. 1980) ("It is well accepted that the operation of a motor
vehicle on the public highways is a privilege, and not a right, subject to reasonable
regulation ...in the interest of public safety and welfare." (emphasis added)
(citing Lee v. State, 358 P.2d 765, 766 (Kan. 1961))); Harrison v. State, Dep't of
Pub. Safety, Drivers License Div., 298 So. 2d 312, 318 (La. Ct. App. 1974) ("The
same motor vehicle accident may give rise to .. .proceedings . . .to determine
151920151
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To fully understand this line of reasoning, it is important to
distinguish between what constitutes a "right" and what constitutes
a "privilege... One common way of differentiating between a right
and a privilege is to identify the ability of third party interference."'
This country was created on the idea that "all humans have certain
rights that are inherent and inalienable."'
89
Many of these rights are inalienable-and generally insulated
from third party interference-because they are "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." 90 Many of these rights are
fundamental and cannot be interfered with.' 9 1 Privileges, on the
other hand, do not typically attain the same type of protection."' In
certain contexts-such as professional licensing-privileges are
powers "which can be taken away by the relevant authority."' "
whether a person's privilege to drive shall be revoked .... ." (emphasis added)
(quoting Bowers v. Hults, 249 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964))); People v.
Rosenheimer, 102 N.E. 530, 532 (N.Y. 1913) ("[T]he whole of this argument rests
on the proposition that in operating a motor vehicle the operator exercises a
privilege which might be denied him, and not a right, and that in a case of a
privilege the Legislature may prescribe on what conditions it shall be exercised."
(emphasis added)); Cafaro, supra note 16, at 102.
187. See Kevin Eggers, Difference Between 'Individual Rights' and 'Privileges,'NAPA
VALLEY REG. (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://napavalleyregister.com/news
/opinion/mailbag/difference-betwee n-individual-rights-and-privileges/article
_07f76ae8-4029-11e3-926c-001a4bcf887a.html ("Understanding the difference
between 'individual rights' and government-provided 'privileges' is as important as
understanding the difference between freedom and slavery.").
188. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Does the State Create the Market-And Should It
Pursue Efficiency ?, 33 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 779, 793 (2010) ("[A] right is not held
at the mercy of another, or of the state .... Privileges, on the other hand, are
accorded to us by one in a superior position, who retains authority to restrict or
eliminate those privileges . . . ."); Eggers, supra note 187 ("[I]f we as individuals
own the 'right,' it's our individual right. If the government owns (or controls) the
'right,' it's really a privilege.").
189. 7 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Constitutional Law § 10 (5th ed. 2003).
190. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
191. See 7 DUNNELL MINN. DIGESTConstitutional Law, supra note 189, § 10 ("The
fourteenth amendment denies the states the power to deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
192. See Sandefur, supra note 188, at 793 (arguing that citizens "do not deserve
a privilege" and "[p]rivileges . . . are accorded to us by one in a superior
position").
193. Sandeep Gopalan, Skilling's Martyrdom: The Case for Criminalization Without
Incarceration, 44 U.S.F. L. REv. 459, 482 (2010); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 122A.18,
subdiv. 8(c) (2014) (stating the instances in which the Commissioner of Education
1520 [Vol. 41:4
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The court in Brooks focused most of its analysis on whether
Brooks had consented to the chemical test or not. However, the
Brooks Court itself explicitly recognized McNeely and that implied
consent laws operate as "legal tools" which states may use to help
prevent drunk driving. 9 5 Despite the court's recognition of "legal
tools," the principle that driving is a privilege has already been
recognized by Minnesota in State v. Parker.'9
In Parker, the defendant was convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol.' 9' During a civil proceeding, the trial court
sustained the revocation of the defendant's driver's license. The
defendant appealed the criminal conviction, arguing that it was
unconstitutional-as a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause-
because he had already been punished for the same behavioral
incident by having his driver's license revoked. 99
The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed. 2°° The court first
addressed the Double Jeopardy Clause issue and stated that while
civil remedies may be an inconvenience to some, they also serve to
deter drunk driving and do not equate to a punishment sufficient
to implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause.20 Further, the court
reasoned, "Driving is a privilege voluntarily granted 
by the state. 20 2
Given the fact that driving is a privilege-and not a
fundamental right-it is sensible for the state to attach certain,
reasonable conditions drivers must abide by in order to have a
203
license. In fact, refusing to take a chemical test when an officer
has probable cause to believe a driver is impaired is not the only
may revoke a teacher's license); id. § 148.262, subdiv. 1(2) (stating the
circumstances under which a nurse's license may be revoked); id. § 518A.66
(describing the procedure for occupational license suspension in Minnesota for
failure to pay child support).
194. See State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568-72 (Minn. 2013).
195. Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
196. 538 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); see Minnesota Driving Law,
ST. DRIVING L., http://www.statedrivinglaw.com/minnesota-driving-law.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2015) ("Driving in Minnesota is a privilege.").
197. Parker, 538 N.W.2d at 142.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 144.
201. Id. at 143.
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. 24 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Highways § 5.01 (5th ed. 2007) ("The
[Minnesota] statute requires motorists to have a driver's license, which is
revocable on grounds of unfitness and other causes.").
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204
situation in which a driver's license may be revoked. Therefore,
despite not specifically categorizing driving as a privilege, 205 the
court in Brooks correctly upheld Minnesota's Implied Consent Law
as being constitutional.
D. Implied Consent Statutes Are Necessary as a Matter of Public Policy
Generally, laws dealing with traffic violations are enacted for
the purpose of facilitating public safety on the roadways."" Much of
the controversy surrounding implied consent statutes deals with
balancing the state's interest in public safety and preserving
evidence against the constitutional rights of the person who has
207
been stopped by the police. Minnesota's implied consent statute
strikes a careful balance between both of these important interests.
As stated previously, drunk driving is a major problem in the
2081United States today. In Minnesota, 25,719 impaired drivers were
arrested in 2013 alone. 2 09 A total of "596,170 Minnesota residents
204. See MINN. STAT. § 171.18, subdiv. 1 (2014) (stating that a driver's license
may be suspended for a number of reasons, including but not limited to: (1) being
a "habitually reckless or negligent driver," (2) violating many traffic laws, and (3)
failing "to report a medical condition that . . . would have resulted in
cancellation").
205. See State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 569 n.4 (Minn. 2013).
206. See Robert Force, Administrative Adjudication of Traffic Violations Confronts
the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 49 TUL. L. REv. 84, 135 (1974) ("The principal
purpose in traffic laws is to regulate driver behavior and promote public safety.")
(emphasis added); DorothyJ. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 295, 367 (2004) ("ITS traffic management systems serve such societal interests
as traffic safety, environmental protection, as well as preventing traffic
congestion.").
207. See Daniel Gross, Comment, Closing the Loophole: Shea's Law and DWI Blood
Draws in New York State Under Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law § 11 94(4)(A)(1), 74 ALB.
L. REv. 951, 968-69 (2011) (recognizing the need to "'balance the State's interest
in obtaining the necessary evidence against the constitutional rights of the
individual."'(quoting People v. Elysee, 49 A.D.3d 33, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)));
Alison Betts, Minnesota High Court Reviews Implied Consent in Drunk Driving Cases,
SOBERING UP (Sept. 11, 2014), http://scramsystems.com/blog/2014/09
/rainnesota-high-court-reviews-implied-consent-dnrnk-driving-cases/#.VCbOtPldX8s
("Many... view implied consent laws as a key tool to prosecuting impaired drivers
and keeping the roads safer. But opponents argue that those efforts can't, and
don't have to, infringe on a suspect's rights.").
208. See Drunk Driving Statistics, supra note 12 ("Drunk driving costs the United
States $199 billion a year").
209. OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, MINN. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, MINNESOTA
IMPAIRED DRIVING FAcTS 2013, at 1 (2013), available at https://dps.mn.gov/divisions
1522 [Vol. 41:4
23
Florey: Conditions to Drive: The Constitutionality of Minnesota's Implied
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
STATE V. BROOKS
have one or more impaired driving incidents'on their driving
record., 2 0 That amounts to "11.0% of all people living in
Minnesota. 2 1' These numbers are very concerning, particularly
when considering a vast number of Minnesota residents are too
young to drive.2 ' "Out of the 2013 total of licensed drivers in
Minnesota, 1 in 7 has one or more incidents on record, 1 in 16 has213
two or more, and 1 in 35 have three or more. The violators tend
to be young adults between the ages of twenty to thirty-four years
214
old. Additionally, males tend to violate impaired driving laws at a
much higher rate than females.215
The exceedingly high number of impaired driving violations,
in part, deals specifically with the offenders themselves.1 6 As
compared to other categories of criminal offenders, drunk drivers. . .. . 217
tend to have worse levels of recidivism. These numbers are highly
concerning given the cost of incidents involving alcohol. To be
sure, not all of the incidents involve impaired drivers-for instance,
an accident may involve a drunk pedestrian who was hit by a motor
vehicle. However, the costs are still an important consideration. In
2013, the estimated cost of death for alcohol-related driving
incidents was $4,538,000. 2  The estimated cost for an
/ots/reports-statistics/Documents/min nesota-impaired-driving-facts-2013.pdf.




214. See id. at 1. The report also indicates that a substantial number of
violators-1478 to be exact-were underage drivers. Id.
215. See id. (stating that seventy-three percent of impaired driving violators in
2013 were males).
216. See Michael J. Watson, Note, Carnage on Our Nation's Highways: A Proposal
for Applying the Statutory Scheme of Megan's Law to Drunk-Driving Legislation, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 459, 497 (2008).
217. See OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, MINN. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 209,
at 1 (reporting that in 2013, forty percent of impaired driving violators were
recidivists); Watson, supra note 216, at 497 ("While the recidivism of sex-offenders
remains a debated issue ... it is well-documented and relatively unchallenged that
DUI offenders continue to re-offend."); see also Angela Carlisle, Staggered Sentencing
for Repeat DWJ Offenders: A New Weapon in the War Against Drunk Driving, 25 HAMLINE
J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 87, 88 (2003) ("[T]he problem of drunk driving, specifically repeat
offenders, has continued to plague society despite great strides in legislation and law
enforcement." (emphasis added)).




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss4/7
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
.. . . .219
incapacitating injury was $230,000. Finally, the estimated cost for
non-incapacitating injuries was $58,700. 220 For decades, the
Minnesota legislature has been working to try and put an end to
221the drunk-driving epidemic.
When constructing laws to eradicate drunk driving, the
Minnesota Legislature also considers the severity of the potential
222
injury suffered as a result of drunk driving. Minnesota has
experienced high levels of deaths related to drinking and driving
for many years. In 2013 alone, "387 people died in traffic crashes
and 81 (21%) were in crashes involving impaired . . . drivers.",
2 2
1
Several impaired driving incidents resulted in a conviction for
225criminal vehicular operation of a motor vehicle. Of those
charged with criminal vehicular operation of a motor vehicle,
thirteen incidents resulted in death and 115 incidents resulted in
injuries.226 A person charged with criminal vehicular homicide in
Minnesota "may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or
both. 227
Minnesota's implied consent statute represents a trend among
states of applying harsher punishments in attempt to decrease the
amount of drunk-driving incidents. Similar laws with the same goal
have experienced recent success.22 8 For instance, in 1993, the
Minnesota Legislature passed the "Not-A-Drop" law that made "it
illegal for [persons under the age of 21] to drive while having any
amount of alcohol in their blood., 22' For the first few years after
"Not-A-Drop" law was enacted, the numbers did not indicate a
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 45-57.
222. See id. ("[The number of traffic deaths related to drinking and driving]
began decreasing. . . in response to... legislation and programs modeled in some
part on the Scandinavian countries' tough approach to drinking and driving.").
223. See id. (noting that deaths related to drinking and driving did not begin
to decrease until "around 1980").
224. Id. intro, letter.
225. See id. at 1.
226. Id.
227. MINN. STAT. § 609.2112, subdiv. 1 (2014).
228. See OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFErY, MINN. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 209,
at 1 (identifying harsher laws, such as "Not-A-Drop," which are aimed at reducing
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significant drop in underage drinking and driving.23 Recently,
however, the number of underage drunk drivers has decreased
rapidly.23'
In 1997, the Minnesota Legislature enacted another harsh
punishment for impaired driving offenses, which led to decreases
232
in such offenses. This legislation also proved to be successful over
the next fifteen years. The legislation provided for special sanctions
applicable to offenders with an alcohol concentration level of "0.20
percent or higher., 23 3 As a result of this legislation, "[t]here has
been a steady decline among high-scoring violators.2 31
Minnesota's implied consent statute is another law that
attempts to come down hard on drunk drivers. Even the United
States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of implied
215
consent statutes. Overall, however, the results have been mixed as
236
to how well implied consent statutes deter drunk driving. One of
the main reasons why some implied consent laws have not lived up
to hopes is that refusal rates are very high in some areas of the
237
country.
Minnesota, however, has not experienced as high of rates of
238
test refusal. In fact, between the periods of 1996 to 2001, test
211
refusals in Minnesota dropped from 17.6% to 14.8%. Part of this
is because Minnesota's implied consent statute creates a criminal
230. See id. (noting "over 3400 violations in 1999").
231. See id. ("The number of such violations ... dropped rather sharply in the
past decade to 687 in 2013.").
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See id. (stating that "high-scoring violators ... were 6,079 in the over
0.20% category in 1998, then 4,034 in 2013").
235. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) (identifying implied
consent laws as part of a state's "legal tools [used] to enforce their drunk-driving
laws").
236. See generally Cicardo, supra note 11, at 256 ("[A]fter Lafourche Parish
implemented no refusal in 2008, the number of drinking and driving fatalities
decreased .... "). But see Cafaro, supra note 16, at 100 ("Implied consent laws, in
theory, can be a powerful weapon in the arsenal against alcohol impaired driving.
However... the fact is that [they] are not deterring [drunk driving].").
237. See Cafaro, supra note 16, at 110 (noting the highest refusal rate at nearly
ninety percent).
238. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIc SAFETY ADMIN., BREATH TEST REFUSALS IN DWI





William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss4/7
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
punishment for test refusal.24" The percentage of test refusal does
not totally represent whether Minnesota's implied consent statute
is deterring drunk driving. It does show, however, that prosecutors
in Minnesota will have an easier time charging people for drunk
driving. One of the biggest interferences to a successful impaired
driving prosecution is the lack of evidence for blood alcohol
content. The chances of a conviction for impaired driving are
noticeably reduced when prosecution is denied BAC evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
Drinking and driving has been a problem in Minnesota that
dates back to the early 1900s. 21' The severity of drunk-driving
incidents, viewed from a public safety standpoint, creates a great
need for the Minnesota Legislature to create laws that severely
punish people who choose to endanger the public by getting
behind the wheel of a motor vehicle when they are intoxicated. As
a response, Minnesota's implied consent statute is one of many
statutes that aim to help decrease the number of drunk drivers.
2 4
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly held in State v. Brooks that
Minnesota's implied consent statute is constitutional for the
following reasons.
First, Minnesota's implied consent statute is a valid exercise of
state police power, which is aimed at protecting the public at
large.E45 Further, driving is a privilege-not a right-and therefore
the State is allowed to attach certain reasonable conditions to the
privilege to drive, including the implied consent statute.246 Finally,
Minnesota's implied consent statute needs to be upheld for public
policy reasons because it plays an important role in the fight
against drunk driving in Minnesota."' To date, a sufficiently
effective alternative for combating drunk driving has not been
240. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.20, subdiv. 2 (2014).
241. See Cafaro, supra note 16, at 111-12 ("Many motorists know it is a difficult
task for the prosecution to obtain a conviction in an OUI trial, absent a BAC
reading.").
242. See id. at 101.
243. See OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, MINN. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 209,
at 34.
244. See supra Part II.
245. See supra Part 1V.B.
246. See supra Part 1V.C.
247. See supra Part IV.D.
1526 [Vol. 41:4
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created. Therefore, the court in Brooks correctly u the
constitutionality of Minnesota's 
implied consent statute.
248. See State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 573 (Minn. 2013).
15272015]
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss4/7
